In attempting to get beyond the paradigm of “emotions recollected in tranquility,” which seems to be what conceptual poetry in its widest sense is trying to do, I’ve been increasingly drawn to models of poetry as revealing something about the way we think and even expanding our perspectives or patterns of thought. And while it’s important to avoid the trap of embracing cognitive neuroscience and neuroaesthetics as directly applicable holistic theories, in short, as replacement paradigms, I am interested in what these emerging fields will eventually have to say about the way that poetry thinks differently from other modes of language and how those differences might be used.
In thinking on ekphrasis, I continually run up against the question of why—what is it good for? I tend to think the arts have functions—they teach us, they enable us, they create concrete changes in our perceptions and thus in our abilities that can improve our lives. My thinking on this has been influenced in part by the work of Semir Zeki, a scientist in neuroaesthetics who argues that the visual arts, particularly painting, train us to see constants and to gradually develop overall perceptual continuity. In the evolution of both the species and the individual the creation and perception of art has reinforced the recognition of meaningful patterns and helped suppress distraction by ones that are not.
What are the parallels in poetry? And while there very well might be none, there is, nonetheless, something to be gained by considering the similarities and differences in the development of painting and poetry since the emergence of the avant-garde at the turn of the last century.
Though the world has changed enormously, from a neurological perspective, the visual fields we’re asked to see and to “read” haven’t changed all that much—a meadow with moving grass in front of trees against a blue sky is as much a matter of elements forming patterns in motion figuring against a ground as is a crowd of people moving along a sidewalk beneath a city skyline or even, in some respects, as the type and images that shift across a computer screen. All demand that we make figure/ground distinctions, that we recognize patterns based on similarity and contrast, hold several in our heads at one time, and grasp their mutual dependence or independence.
Though the basic dynamics may not have importantly changed, what has changed dramatically in the arts of the past 100 years is subject matter—and it’s not so much what the subject is that interests me here (though that too has changed), but its role in the work of art, be it painting or poem.
Subject matter is in many ways a mask; it’s there to mask more deeply operative structural elements, such as rhythm, parallelism, and juxtaposition. Masks are famously very complex affairs—their purpose is not only to hide but also to entice; they work on a push-pull principle that creates desire through suggestion and delay. A mask is something made to be passed through; its purpose is to slow us down, to make us aware of what we’re doing: that we are passing through, and thus, that we’re heading into something else, that our attention should sharpen, that we should beware. Subject matter functions the same way, luring us into more core structural issues with our senses heightened—luring us into the real subject, which is motion, how the world’s appearances are constructed by the dynamic relationships of their elements.
Increasingly, the visual arts and some poetry have worked to distill subject matter so that core structural elements and their dynamics are laid bare or at least made much more apparent. The visual arts, however, have been more successful at this than poetry, and in part, it’s because, after a very promising start, epitomized by Gertrude Stein, who recognized something in cubism’s geometric and perspectival shifts that she was also doing in writing, poetry took a turn which confused distillation with simplification. Simplified language reduced the evidence of underlying dynamics revealed through rhythm, echo, juxtaposition, etc. and angled instead toward speech-based language that equated “simpler” with both “clearer” and “truer.” I have all those terms in quotes because they’re particularly bottomless ones, and it was precisely through taking them as not bottomless that the primacy of such language as art could be advanced. Such simplified language relies much more heavily on subject matter to the point that subject matter in poetry has been allowed to take over, so that it no longer functions correctly as a mask; it no longer draws us toward core dynamic elements; instead, it has replaced them, so that the very elements to which art attunes us have been washed out.
A poetry dominated by subject matter does not result in work that exalts its surface, as one might expect, but rather slathers a distracting layer of false accuracy over it. There are many exceptions to such work throughout the 20th century; however, the mainstream of American poetry has continually downplayed the sonic bones of the medium, thus downplaying the very elements that constitute the aesthetic: the elements that shift attention from an immediate instance to dynamic principles that allow a given instance to have meaning, whether meaning is defined as having a relation to a larger frame or having an impact on the perceiver.
Central to these principles is rhythm, which Craig Dworkin touches on in his discussion of “interval” in Kenny Goldsmith’s work: “the collapse of distances into equal measures, and the differences and repetitions subsequently legible.” It is to bring time into the work, not as simple duration but as active occupation. The fact that no actual event, object, or utterance can exactly fit a pre-determined rhythm guarantees that the system that is the poem or the painting can never fall into homogeneity. Particularity is itself the clinamen that thwarts that possibility.
While poetry, as an art that necessarily takes place in time, might be expected to show a much more nuanced treatment of these dynamics, it is 20th visual arts that have more frequently struck a balance that allows this essential and compelling play to show through, and as for the question of what ekphrasis can do: it can be poetry in the act of analyzing how the visual arts have accomplished this.
I’d like to go now to a series of images and look at them with a focus on how underlying dynamics such as rhythm, parallelism, and juxtaposition show on the surface, and as such, show a unifying principle between very different subjects as if the underlying structure of a street scene could be the same as that of a still life of pears or a stormy seascape.
I’d like to suggest that the similarities between these principles in painting and in poetry are not metaphorical, but that visual rhythm requires some of the same mental processes that aural rhythm does and that the pattern recognition in both can play the same role of attuning our senses to crucial patterns in the outside world, creating a relevance that participates in meaning.
(Followed by several slides . . .)
I’d like to address the others in the title Conceptual Poetry and Its Others. There are so many ways we could take this word; the one I’m going to focus on is as implying that conceptual poetry has allies or counterparts in its projects, that there are other modes of contemporary poetry that share some of conceptual poetry's values and interests.
Principal among these interests is the role of the subject. Craig Dworkin raises the issue in the first line of his introduction to the Ubuweb anthology of conceptual writing: Poetry expresses the emotional truth of the self. Though it’s the notion of “expressive” writing that gets most developed, self here is perhaps the more problematic term, and many of conceptual poetry's others are also interested in replacing the assumption of a consistent, sovereign I with a differently nuanced understanding of point of view, framing, and voice.
A number of writers have approached the problem by constructing speaking positions that are broadly dispersed, and in so doing are either consciously or inadvertently echoing models of distributed cognition, an area of the cognitive sciences which recognizes that individual minds are not self-sufficient, independent entities, but part of complex networks incorporating communities and objects. Language itself offers a perfect example, one that we readily recognize as both playing a large part in our thought processes and necessitating a group. As Wittgenstein says at great length: “There is no such thing as a private language.”
And cognitive networks often incorporate objects. Conceptual poetry is full of inventive examples, such as Kenny Goldsmith's use of everything from the newspaper to the tape recorder to optical character recognition. Christian Bök similarly uses various objects and systems; in his current project, he's collaborating with a scientist and using DNA structures. And almost all writers today use a computer; its rhythm and pace effect the speed of thought and the patterning of words, and its memory constitutes a significant annex to our own.
Cognitive networks often incorporate objects, one of the most frequent these days being the computer. While I may have the feeling that I’m doing all the thinking as I’m composing a text on my computer, its rhythm and pace have an effect on the speed at which I think and on the patterning of my words, and its memory constitutes a significant annex to my own.
And while the self is constituted of more than cognition, many of its other aspects also participate in networks, making the use of an “I” that seems completely congruent with the writer’s persona feel a bit hollowly constructed, an artifice desperately hoping to garner some control within the heady field of impressions and experiences.
Alternatives to the illusion of the sovereign self are numerous and varied in contemporary writing. One example—and I choose it simply because I particularly enjoy it—involves writers who incorporate history in their work. Three quick examples, one chosen because she’s here, another because she was going to be here and at the last minute couldn’t be, and the third because she could just as well be here, and so serves as a reminder of the vast number of “others” that conceptual poetry has.
1. Caroline Bergvall and her Shorter Chaucer Tales: She not only chose a root text noted for its poly-vocalism, but launched off from it with vocabulary from different languages, some living, some revived, some invented, to create a relentless lens through which she views certain contemporary social issues until their true strangeness floats to the surface. It’s performs a kind of ostrananie, denaturalizing while also demanding an historical accounting.
2. Susan Howe's Scare Quotes I & II: Though almost all of Susan's work would make an equally good example, the Scare Quotes texts are particularly apt because of their use of collage, achieved by radical juxtaposition of point of view and tone. And though she distinguishes her own experience through the use of the authorial I, it is not privileged, but is presented among the experiences of many others, all of which are given equal weight and together constitute the voice of the text, which is quite different from Howe's own.
3. Thalia Field's Ululu: Channeled through a single fictional character who was interpreted by several artists (not to mention thousands of viewers), point of view is refracted through the prism of the imaginary, and by presenting her in all her permutations, Field re-divides and multiplies that “seeing I” until the media themsevles: film, theater, extrapolation, censorshipCend up doing the talking, end up filling the true “I” of the piece.
This I, and those of Howe and Bergvall as well as of many other contemporary writers, is not a stable one, and it doesn’t want to be. It is, instead, dynamic, carrying a momentum that demands constant reconstitution, which is perhaps more similar to our own lived “I”s whose extended networks change constantly according to the situation.
While such works could be called selfless, it’s not in the way that Tenny refers to in his question about Buddhism; in these cases, their ultimate selflessness comes from an overflow of self that generates past counting. Both expressive and emotional, they do not express the emotions of a single, consolidated subject; instead, they refuse the easy invention of a self that amounts to self-centeredness to create a more intricate, as well as more generous and more accurate, position from which speech happens.
But this approach does have implications for the direct presentation of language, as the fluid distribution of subjectivity ultimately transfers authority to language itself: language speaks the field through which the I wanders, unanchored.
Research-based work in general tends toward both distributed subjectivity and foregrounded language because the subject is no longer the subject; i.e. the subject matter is no longer the speaking subject and his/her emotions recollected.